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Abstract
A technique for the design of flight control systems that can accommodate a set of
actuator failures is presented. As employed herein, an actuator failure is defined as any change
in the parametric model of the actuator which can adversely affect actuator performance. The
technique is based upon the formulation of a fixed feedback topology which ensures at least
stability in the presence of the failures in the set. The fixed compensation is obtained from a
loop-shaping design procedure similar to Quantitative Feedback Theory and provides stability
robustness in the presence of uncertainty in the vehicle dynamics caused by the failures. System
adaptation to improve performance after actuator failure(s) occurs through a static gain
adjustment in the compensator followed by modification of the system prefilter. Precise
identification of the vehicle dynamics is unnecessary. Application to a single-input, single-output
design using a simplified model of the longitudinal dynamics of the NASA High Angle of Attack
Research Vehicle is discussed. Non-real time simulations of the system including a model of
the pilot demonstrate the effectiveness and limitations of the approach.
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2Graduate Student
3Postdoctoral Researcher
Introduction
The requirements that will accompany the design of future, high-performance aircraft,
whether inhabited or uninhabited, will likely include some ability to automatically reconfigure
the aircraft flight control system to accommodate control effector failure(s) and/or damage to
the airframe itself. The advent of Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV's) 1 will certainly
increase research activity in this area, as will recent emphasis on airline safety. 2 Thus, the
design of "reconfigurable" or "restructurable" flight control systems is of continuing importance
to the research community. Reconfigurable control systems are those possessing the ability to
accommodate system failures automatically through on-line self-modification. Reconfigurable
control is a challenging design problem, as it usually entails failure-detection, system
identification, and on-line controller-redesign. A sampling of this research can be found in Refs.
3-12.
The design philosophy to be discussed herein will be applied to the problem of failure
of one or more of the actuators which drive the thrust/aerodynamic effectors in a flight control
system, e.g., elevator, thrust-vectoring nozzles. Attention will be focused upon maintaining
stability and performance in the presences of these failures. The flight control scenario to be
examined assumes that the human pilot is controlling the vehicle when failure occurs, and will
resume control after reconfiguration is completed. While actuator failures constitute only a
subset of possible damage that can occur to a flight vehicle, the ability to accommodate such
damage in a flight control system is pertinent for the following reason: The control effectors
which the actuators drive are powerful force and moment producers. Thus, if a design
methodology can provide stability and performance robustness in the presence of failure of these
devices, there is reasonable hope that it can serve as a candidate reconfigurable design
methodology for other classes of problems, e.g., airframe damage.
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Conceptually, the designapproachto be discussedis considerablylesscomplex (and
admittedlylessmathematicallysophisticated)thanotherswhichhavebeenproposed,e.g., Refs.
3-12, in thatmuchof theflight control systemremainsunchangedin thepresenceof theactuator
failure. This designphilosophywaspursuedfor simplicity and for its relianceupon proven
frequency-domaindesigntechniques. It may behyperboleto refer to the adaptiveformulation
employedhereasa "reconfigurable"control system,however, for the sakeof brevity, this will
bedone.
Approach
Design Preliminary Considerations
The research to be described will first concentrate upon ensuring that the aircraft Stability
and Command Augmentation System (SCAS) is as robust as possible to the effects of actuator
failure(s). This implies requiring at least stability in the presence of the failures to be considered
and will depend upon the existence of redundant aerodynamic/propulsive control effectors, i.e.,
effectors that provide control authority comparable to that of the effector(s) whose actuator(s)
has failed. While the existence of redundant effectors may seem to be a significant requirement,
it must be emphasized that the reconfiguration technique being discussed is intended to
accommodate complete as well as partial failure of actuators. An important part of the design
procedure for the undamaged aircraft is the inclusion of software rate limiters, whose purpose
is to improve system performance when actuator saturation occurs. The design and utility of
such software rate limiters have been discussed in the literature. 13
Design Philosophy
The philosophy behind the design approach rests upon the established tenet that careful
application of frequency-domain loop-shaping techniques can provide a SCAS (with fixed
compensator) which exhibits stability and performance robustness in the presence of significant
uncertaintyin thedynamicsof thevehiclebeingcontrolled. An attemptto extendthis approach
to encompassuncertaintybroughtaboutby actuatorfailureswould likely producecompensators
with unacceptablyhigh bandwidth. However, reducingtherequirementson thecompensatorto
providing stability and performancerobustnessfor the undamagedvehicle and only stability
robustnessfor the damagedvehicle can offer a significant reduction in required system
bandwidth. Creatingan adaptivesystemwith a modestamountof reconfigurationcapability
wouldallow someof theperformancerobustness,lost in thefailures, to be regained. Thus,the
approachto be discussedwill distributethe responsibilityfor accommodatingactuatorfailures
betweena fixed compensationelementor elementsanda relativelysimpleadaptivesystem.
DesignFramework
Figure 1 is a diagrammatic representation of the design framework to be pursued. Note
that full-envelope design is the goal. One begins with a set of healthy aircraft models, i.e.,
those with undamaged actuators, at the flight conditions representative of the vehicle's
operational envelope. To this set is appended the failed aircraft models, i.e., those with
damaged actuators. Performance goals for the healthy aircraft are established that ensure
satisfactory handling qualities with no tendencies for pilot-induced oscillations. Analytical means
addressing these latter design constraints are available. 14 Failure detection will not be addressed
in what follows. It will be assumed that the failure of an actuator(s) will be detected, but that
the nature of this failure and the particular actuator(s) involved will not be known.
Pre-Design Technique A QFT Pre-Design Technique (PDT) 15 is employed and flight
control laws (compensation elements) are created with the PDT that attempt to (1) meet the
performance goals for the undamaged aircraft, (2) ensure stability for the damaged aircraft, and
to (3) minimize the necessity of dynamic reconfiguration, i.e., that requiring changes in the
dynamic compensation elements of the SCAS. The possibility of gain-scheduling with flight
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conditionis includedwith theaimof reducingcontrollerbandwidths. Finally, andif necessary,
a "formal" QFT designcanbeundertakenin which theapproximatecontrol lawsobtainedwith
thePDT areevaluatedand modified, if necessary.15It is importantto note that, aswith any
QFT design,stability canbeguaranteednot just for thosefailureswhich areexplicitly included
in the failed set, but for any failures that exhibit dynamics with magnitude and phase
characteristicsthat fall within the boundsdefinedby the membersof the original failure set.
This will be demonstratedin theexampleto beconsidered.
Adaptive Logic While the final QFT designwill ensuresatisfactoryhandlingqualities
and PIO immunity for the healthy aircraft, on/y stability will be sought with the damaged
aircraft. Hence, an adaptive system is created for the purpose of recovering as much
performance as possible under conditions of actuator failure. Concentrating upon a single-input,
single-output (SISO) system (or a single loop of a multi-input, multi-output system) for the
purposes of exposition, the adaptive logic consists of two parts. The first part is simply a static
gain that multiplies the compensator obtained from the PDT approach (which emulates a QFT
design). The multiplicative term is adjusted based upon the system response to a test input. The
ability of a single, variable gain to ensure stability is a result of the PDT approach. The second
part of the logic involves a reconfiguration of the SCAS prefilter as a lead-lag element with
parameters also dependent upon the system response to the test input. This reconfiguration
recoups SCAS bandwidth lost when stability is maintained through the static gain variation just
described.
The adaptive logic is implemented as follows: After detection of a failure, a test square-
wave input is applied to the SCAS (with pilot inputs eliminated). A simple classification
technique is employed in which responses are first characterized as oscillatory ("positive"
overshoot) and non-oscillatory ("negative" overshoot, i.e., no overshoot and sluggish response).
Baseduponthis classification,thestaticgain term is varieduntil theresponsesmeeta percent
overshoot(PO) criterion, e.g., PO,m _ PO _ POma_ . The time from the initiation of each
pulse of the square-wave to the response variable's achieving it maximum value is used
determine the form of the prefilter lead term. As just described, the "reconfiguration"
formulation appears very ad-hoc in nature. However, it is based upon relatively simple, time
and frequency-domain relationships which can be examined in real-time as part of the adaptive
logic.
Simulation Non-real time and piloted simulation complete the design process outlined
in Fig. 1. In the former simulation category, realistic models of pilot tracking behavior should
be included.
An Example
Design Overview
Pre-Design Technique A brief example of a SISO system can be offered that
demonstrates the design procedure. Figure 2 shows the former NASA High-Angle-of-Attack
Research Vehicle (HARV). For the purposes of this example, attention is focused on
longitudinal pitch-control with redundant effectors consisting of the elevator (stabilator) and
pitch-thrust vectoring. For brevity's sake, only a single flight condition is employed here.
Thus, the performance bounds one finds in a typical QFT design are not employed. Figure 3
shows the pitch-rate flight control system diagram and pilot-loop closure for pitch-attitude
tracking.
The Pre-Design Technique can be briefly summarized as follows. The compensator Go(s)
is chosen as
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where o c is the crossover frequency of the SCAS loop transmission q
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q I,,om is the q to u c transfer function for the undamaged vehicle
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satisfactory for the undamaged vehicle given uncertainty introduced by considering different
flight conditions and/or by errors in the vehicle model, (b) rejection of constant disturbances
injected as the actuator inputs is minimized, i.e. to minimize effects of non-zero null failures of
the actuators, and (c) q is stable for all actuator failures considered. Prefilter dynamics F(s)
qc
are then selected to yield predicted level one handling qualities with no PIO susceptibility for
the undamaged vehicle. Care must obviously be taken in employing Eq. 1 if q ],,ore is unstable
U c
or possesses right-half plane zeros (neither of which occurred in this example). In the former
case, o must be greater than the real part of the unstable pole with the most positive real part,
and pole-zero cancellation with the plant must be avoided, while in the latter case, 6o must be
less than the real part of the non-minimum phase zero with the most positive real part, and
again, pole-zero cancellation with the plant must be avoided.
Table 1 gives the vehicle and (healthy) actuator dynamics, taken from Ref. 16. In
addition, characteristics of the cockpit force/feel system, to be included in the pilot/vehicle
simulation are given. Also note that rate and amplitude-limiting were included in the actuator
models. Table 2 lists the actuator failure characteristics. A set of 35 combinations of actuator
failures define the damaged vehicle set. This set includes the undamaged or healthy aircraft.
Figure 4 shows the bode diagramsof the transfer functions q[u c from Fig. 3 with the 35
failures. Compensation and prefilter elements Gq(S) and F(s) were obtained using the PDT of
Ref. 15 ensuring that the criteria described in the preceding were satisfied, i.e., predicted level
one handling qualities and no predicted PIO tendencies with the undamaged aircraft, stability
with the damaged aircraft, with the potential of crossover-frequency variation (through a
multiplicative gain) stabilizing the SCAS. The handling and PIO predictions were accomplished
using the pilot modeling procedure described in Ref. 17. The resulting Go(s), F(s) and60
were
O¢(s) : -20.2(s 2 +2(0.35) 1.12s + 1.122)(s 2 +2 (0.6)20s +202)(s 2 +2(0.69)30s +302)
s(s +0.493)(s 2 +2(0.606)21.14s +21.142)(s +37.5) 3
0.3s+l
F(s) -
0.1s+l
coc -- 2.5 rad/sec
(2)
The complexity of G¢(s) is dut to the PDT which involves inversion of the plant dynamics
(including actuators) as indicated in Eql 1. Simplification of Gc(s) is possible, but was not
pursued herein. Figure 5 shows the Bode diagram of Gc(S). Since IGcq_O)l does not increase
beyond the 2.5 rad/sec crossover frequency, a modest "cost of feedback" is involved. 15
Software Rate Limiters and Control Distribution Matrix The software rate limiters
will be discussed only briefly herein. These devices have shown promise for improving the
performance in the presence of actuator saturation under normal operation 13and have thus been
included as part of the SCAS design. For their implementation the software limiters require a
control distribution matrix K which distributes the single pseudo-control Uc to the two actuators,
one commanding stabilator position and the second commanding pitch thrust nozzle position.
For rate limiter implementation, each row of K contains only a single non-zero entry equal (or
proportional) to the magnitude of the rate-limit of the actuator which it affects. In the relatively
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simpleexamplehere, K is thus chosen as
The software limiters are implemented so that the maximum rate command to either actuator
does not exceed its rate limit, here 60 deg/sec for either actuator as indicated in Table 1. Note
that the differentiating "s" in Fig. 3 is always subsumed into the strictly proper Gc(s ).
Fixed Compensation Figure 6 shows the SCAS loop transmissions (q/qe in Fig. 3) for
the 35 failures on a Nichols chart. Note that closed-loop stability is in evidence. For
comparison, Fig. 7 is a similar diagram for the undamaged aircraft. Figure 8 demonstrates the
extreme variation in closed-loop behavior of the SCAS which occurs with failed actuators.
Here, the SCAS step responses (q to qcp from Fig. 3) for all the failure cases are shown. By
contrast, Fig. 9 shows the step response for the undamaged aircraft.
Adaptive Logic As alluded to in the preceding, the adaptive logic which defined the
reconfigurable system was predicated upon real-time examination of the pitch-rate response q(t)
to a square-wave command injected as shown in Fig. 3, with pilot inputs excluded from the
system. Based upon the bandwidths of q/q¢ for the failed systems with the fixed compensation
of Eq. 2, the duration of each pulse of the square wave was selected as 4 sec, with the first 2
sec of the response to each pulse examined in the adaptive system. The static multiplying term
included in GJs) was (1 + KD) where Ko was initially zero. K_, was then varied in the following
manner: If the response to the square-wave pulse indicated "negative" overshoot (i.e., no
overshoot and a value less than the commanded value two sec from the initiation of any square-
wave pulse) then K D was increased. If the response indicated an overshoot, K o was decreased.
The adaptive logic was such that changes in KD were inversely proportional to the amount of
overshoot (positive or negative), i.e.,
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KD(O) = ±0.1
1 (4)
go(kT) = Kt)((k-1) T) ± 10.05.PO I
K_(k_ = _min[IKD,(k_l, _,2"lK_ffk-1)r)l]
with the "+" or "-" sign depedent upon whether a "positive" or "negative" overshoot was in
evidence. Equation 4 implies that after the initial 0.1 value, changes in Kz) were relatively small
early in the adaptive procedure. This was done for the following reason: It is possible that
large turbulence disturbances could mask the nature of the q-step response of the vehicle. Thus,
an Kz) change of incorrect sign could occur early in the adaptation. If this incorrect change were
large enough, the SCAS could be destabilized. The overshoot criterion which determined
whether reconfiguration was to be initiated, and if initiated, when it should be terminated was
-5% _ PO _ 10% (5)
Selection of PO,,o_ and POre, , was based upon the desire to allow K o variation to provide most
of the transient response improvement for the SCAS.
The prefilter reconfiguration was employed to improve the transient response
characteristics of q/qcp beyond that obtainable with variation in the SCAS compensator gain
(l+Ko), alone. It involved first removing the prefilter of Eq. 2 when a failure had been
detected, i.e. setting F(s) = 1.0. After the final Ko value had been obtained, a new prefilter
was inserted in the system, given by
[(TM/4)S+I]2 (6)
F/(s) =
(O.is+l)2
where TM is the "effective" time constant of the q response. The F'(s) given by Eq. 6 implies
amplification of the pilot's command in the frequency range beyond 4/TM. This amplification
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is attributableto theseverenatureof thefailures in themodeledset,manyof which introduced
large, serial, time delays in the SCAS. Thus the characteristics of F'(s) are a necessary part of
the price to be paid for reconfiguration with the present scheme. It should be emphasized, that
the impact of this amplification will be a function of q[qc with failed actuators. In Eq. 6, TM
was the time at which the response variable q achieved its maximum value within the duration
of any pulse of the square-wave input, (or 2 sec, whichever was smaller). This TM definition
is shown in Fig. 10 for the "positive" and "negative" overshoot cases just described. Equation
6 was obtained by first approximating the bandwidth 6% of qlqc as
4
_B - (7)L,
Two simple zeros for the prefilter F'(s) were then placed at s = -(o s.
Simulation
Pilot Model The efficacy of the design technique just outlined was investigated in a non-
real time simulation. A realistic pilot model was included: with dynamics based upon the
undamaged vehicle. A cross-over frequency of 1.5 rad/sec was selected as representing
aggressive tracking behavior. The pilot model took the form
2.5.105 .e -o._ (8)
Yp(s) = [0.146,14.1][0.778,28.9]
After reconfiguration, the pilot model gain was adjusted so as to maintain the original 1.5
rad/sec crossover frequency. This is equivalent to limiting pilot adaptation to the reconfigured
dynamics (or damaged dynamics in the case where no reconfiguration is allowed) to a change
in "gain". In practice, it would be advisable to reduce the prefilter gain (say by 50%) as part
of the reconfiguration so as to minimize the possibility of PIO tendencies. Gain reductions such
as this have been linked to the elimination of PIO's in some pilot-in-the-loop simulations. TM
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Tracking Task Thepitch-attitudetrackingtaskof Fig. 3 wassimulatedwhereinthepilot
closeda pitch-attitudeloop, with qcp serving as the pilot command to the SCAS. A pseudo-
random sum of sinusoids provided the tracking command 0 c. The root-mean-square value of
this command was 5.7 (0.1 rad) deg. In addition, turbulence was included in the simulation by
injecting a random pitch-rate disturbance with an RMS value of 0.57 deg/sec (.01 rad/sec) into
the vehicle pitch-rate response. During reconfiguration, no pilot inputs were allowed. After
reconfiguration, the pilot model resumed tracking the sum-of sinusoids command as just
described.
Simulation Examples System performance was evaluated for each of the 35 failures.
Space permits only a discussion of two of the most extreme cases. First, Fig. 11 shows the
pilot/vehicle tracking performance for the undamaged vehicle. Figure 12 shows the performance
after reconfiguration for a failure in which the thrust nozzle actuator fails completely (in the null
position) and the stabilator actuator suffers a 50 % reduction in effectiveness or steady-state gain.
Figure 13 shows the performance without reconfiguration. As mentioned previously, when no
reconfiguration was allowed, the pilot/vehicle crossover frequency was still adjusted to maintain
the 1.5 rad/sec crossover frequency after failure. This permitted a fair comparison with the
tracking performance when reconfiguration was allowed. Figure 14 shows the pilot/vehicle
tracking performance following a failure in which the thrust nozzle actuator has again failed
completely and the stabilator actuator has a damaged-induced 0.2 sec added time delay. In this
case, when no reconfiguration was allowed the pilot/vehicle system was unstable. Before
reconfiguration for the two cases just presented, the q to qc responses of the damaged vehicles
were sluggish and highly oscillatory, respectively. Figure 15 shows the reconfiguration
responses for the failure of Fig. 12. i.e., the vehicle's pitch-rate response to the square-wave
pitch-rate inputs as the adaptive logic changes K o to achieve the desired percent overshoot.
Figure 16 shows the corresponding increments in, and final value for, K o. Figures 17 and 18
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showsimilar resultsfor the failure of Fig. 14. In the reconfigurations for these two failures,
Tu in Eq. 6 was 0.5 sec. In the first of the reconfigurations the elapsed time from beginning
to end of reconfiguration until the final K o value was obtained was 12 sec, while for the second,
the time was 36 sec. The average reconfiguration time for all 35 configurations was 25.2 sec,
with the longest being 68 sec. This average did not included those cases (11 in number) for
which no reconfiguration was necessary, i.e., the damaged vehicle was found to meet the
overshoot requirements of Inequality 4. Performance was always found to improve with the
adaptive system when reconfiguration was found to be necessary.
Of interest is the simulation of a failure that was not a member of the modeled set. As
mentioned in the preceding, the only constraint here is that the diagram of the loop transmission q
q,
of the unmodeled failure must lie within the bounds of the loop transmissions of all of the
modeled cases on the Nichols chart. The Nichols chart of Figure 19 shows one such unmodeled
failure that meets this criterion. In this failure the thrust nozzle actuator fails completely, the
steady-state gain of the stabilator actuator increases by 50 % and the undamped natural frequency
of the actuator is reduced from 30 rad/sec to 10 rad/sec. Figure 20 shows the tracking
performance of the pilot/vehicle system with this failure. In this instance, the criterion of
Inequality 4 was met without reconfiguration, so the SCAS and prefilter dynamics remain
unchanged. The tracking performance is seen to be quite satisfactory.
Finally, an additional failure similar to one in the modeled set was included which
involved a complete elevator actuator failure with a non-null angle of 5 deg was evaluated.
Again the reconfiguration scheme performed well. This performance was ensured in the PDT
by requiring good low-frequency disturbance rejection properties for disturbances injected in
parallel with the signal u c in Fig. 3. No significant actuator rate or amplitude saturation
occurred during any of the failures. This leads quite naturally to the subject of the next section.
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Utility of Software Rate Limiters Since the software rate limiters have been included
in the design methodology, and since no significant rate limiting occurred in the 35 failure
configurations simulated, a simulation involving artificially low actuator rate limits was
conducted. These limits of 10 deg/sec on each of the actuators were considered to be the
characteristics of healthy, undamaged actuators. One of the failure modes considered previously
was again simulated, i.e., the thrust actuator failing completely and the stabilator actuator with
50% effectiveness. For the purpose of exposition, the pilot/vehicle response to a step pitch
command rather than the sum of sinusoids was investigated after reconfiguration had occurred.
Figure 21 shows the response of the undamaged system, and Fig. 22 shows the corresponding
stabilator rate. Figure 23 shows the response of the damaged system after reconfiguration.
Here K D = 0.743, TM = 2.0 sec, and the elapsed time from beginning to end of reconfiguration
was 44 sec. Figure 24 shows the corresponding stabilator rate. Finally, Figs. 25 and 26 show
corresponding results for the case in which no reconfiguration was allowed. Note the improved
performance with reconfiguration. As in the previous examples, the pilot "gain" was adjusted
to yield a 1.5 rad/sec crossover frequency after failures. The caveat here, however, is that this
gain adjustment was made on the linear system, i.e., where rate limiting was absent. It should
be noted that when the software rate limiters were removed in the reconfigurable design the
pilot/vehicle system was unstable after reconfiguration. Thus, the inclusion of the software
limiters is important. Finally, the increased "saturation" evident when reconfiguration was
allowed is not saturation in the normal sense, i.e., the actuator is merely being driven by the
software limiter up to its maximum rate, and no more. 13
Discussion
The relative long adaptation times with a number of the failures in which reconfiguration
occurred deserves some comment. The adaptive logic for changing KD is quite rudimentary and
no attempt was made to improve the speed of convergence for this study. Although the
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requirementof SCAS stability in the eventof failure eliminatesthe necessity of very rapid
reconfiguration, improvement is certainly warranted in this area and is currently being pursued.
It should be noted, however, that SCAS performance is improving at each iteration of the
adaptive logic. The process could be terminated prematurely by the pilot if he/she so desires.
Finally, the longer adaptation times were typically associated with the most severe of the
actuator failures, i.e, those in which pilot/vehicle instability resulted when no reconfiguration
was undertaken.
The extension of the technique discussed herein to MIMO systems is straightforward in
theory. Test inputs would be alternated between control loops in the MIMO application, with
the obvious penalty being increased adaptation times. As mentioned in the preceding, one
disadvantage of the methodology lies in the high frequency amplification of pilot inputs created
by the reconfigured prefilter, F'(s). The possibility of biodynamic feedback through the control
effector is a concern in these cases 19, as is the possibility that the reconfigured prefilter may
increase the deleterious effects of damaged actuators wherein the damage affects the rate limit
of the device. Finally, although the reconfiguration scheme allows recapture of much of the
performance lost through actuator failure, it is doubtful whether the methodology can provide
level one handling qualities for all the failures in the cases which were modeled.
Conclusions
A technique for the design of flight control systems that can accommodate actuator
failures has been introduced and demonstrated for a simple SISO example which included a
model of the pilot. The impetus behind the research was the consideration of actuator failure,
ab initio, in the design process. The approach utilized relatively simple, frequency and time-
domain design, with emphasis upon QFT-like loop-shaping methodology. Precise system
identification of the dynamics of the damaged vehicle was unnecessary. No attempt was made
15
to minimize the adaptationtimesafter failure(s)and thesimulationresultsclearly indicatethat
theadaptivelogic will haveto be refinedin order to successfullyapply thetechniqueto multi-
input, multi-output systems. Researchis currently underwayin this area.
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Table 1 Nominal Vehicle Model
Nominal Flight Condition: Alt. = 30,000 ft Mach No. = 0.6
6
$
it(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t)
x(t) = [a(t) q(t)]
= angle of attack, deg
= stabilator angle, deg
A = -0.5088 0.994]
-1.131 -0.2804J
q = pitch rate, deg/s
fit = thrust vector angle, deg
B
"-0.9277 -0.01787"
-6.575 - 1.525
stabilator:
302
s 2+42.4s+302
thrust vector:
202
s 2 +24s +202
Actuator Descriptions
amplitude limit = ±30 deg
amplitude limit = +30 deg
rate limit = 60 deg/sec
rate limit -- 60 deg/sec
Cockpit Force/Feel System Dynamics
252
s 2 +35s +252
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Table 2 Actuator Failure Models
stabilator: 302 KE e-_ 0 _ Ke _ 1.0 0 _ ze _ 0.4 sec
S 2 +42.4s +302
thrust vector: 202 .Kre-,r_ 0 _ K r _ 1.0
s 2 +24s +202
0 _ zr_O.4sec
35 actuator failures created by varying K E, K r, ztr, and _:r
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Figure 11 Pilot/vehicle pitch-attitude tracking performance for undamaged aircraft
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Figure 8 SCAS step responses (q to qcp) for damaged aircraft
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Figure 6 Nichols chart plot of SCAS loop transmissions for damaged aircraft
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Figure 5 Bode plot of PDT compensator Go(s)
40
20
Ok---
i
-40 _--
-60 t
-80 I t l i
0
-90
-180
-270
-360 _
-450 L_
-540
-2
10
U
C
-I
10 10 ° 101 10 2
co rad/sec
Figure 4 Bode plots of transfer functions of vehicle + actuators with actuator failures
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